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The Instrumental Case for Corporate
Diversity
Naomi Cahn,† June Carbone,†† and Nancy Levit†††
A growing body of evidence indicates that diverse businesses
outperform those with less diversity. These findings have fueled
calls for mandating diversity on corporate boards and for
undertaking greater efforts to ensure diversity in the corporate
ranks. The question of where diversity fits in a corporate reform
agenda, however, has yet to be clearly defined. Doing so requires
resolving the following issues.
First, why does greater diversity appear to be correlated with
better performance? Critics correctly observe that the “diverse
companies do better” studies do not prove that simply adding
diversity causes the improvement. Instead, they posit that the
improvement is likely to be endogenous, that is, the factors that
encourage and sustain diversity, such as greater transparency,1
also improve financial performance, and the variables may interact
in multifaceted ways.2
Acknowledging that correlation is not causation, however,
does not make diversity irrelevant as a metric for better
management practices. If the same factors that correlate with
greater diversity also correlate with improved performance, then
greater diversity can be a benchmark for better corporate
†. Justice Anthony M. Kennedy Distinguished Professor of Law, Nancy L. Buc
‘69 Research Professor in Democracy and Equity, University of Virginia School of
Law.
††. Robina Chair in Law, Science and Technology, University of Minnesota Law
School.
†††. Associate Dean for Faculty and Curators’ Distinguished Professor and
Edward D. Ellison Professor of Law, University of Missouri – Kansas City School of
Law. We thank Max Larson for research assistance.
1. See The Nasdaq Stock Mkt. LLC, Self-Regulatory Organization Filing of
Proposed
Rule
Changes
(Form
19b-4)
9
(Dec.
1,
2020),
https://listingcenter.nasdaq.com/assets/RuleBook/Nasdaq/filings/SR-NASDAQ2020-081.pdf [https://perma.cc/6ML8-98PG]; cf. Stephen Miller, Transparency
Shrinks
Gender
Pay
Gap,
SHRM
(Feb.
11,
2020),
https://www.shrm.org/ResourcesAndTools/hr-topics/compensation/Pages/
transparency-shrinks-gender-pay-gap.aspx [https://perma.cc/U79W-7MVK] (finding
greater transparency assists in diminishing the gender pay gap).
2. On the meaning of business performance, see infra text accompanying notes
5, 93–98.
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management. It can make diversity metrics a tool (though not
necessarily an exclusive tool) in measuring the reform of
dysfunctional corporate cultures. Diversity might then become part
of an iterative process; maintaining diversity will require
management reforms such as greater transparency that will in turn
fuel transformations in management cultures that further both
greater diversity and better overall performance.3 We term this use
of diversity as visible and easily measured marker of management
reform “the instrumental case for diversity.
The second question is also a puzzle: if greater diversity
correlates with better business performance, then why has it taken
so long for companies to embrace it, and what accounts for the
persistence of largely white male boards and upper management?
The answer could be path dependence: a largely white and male
management team may not recognize the importance of greater
diversity or how to accomplish it. The existing literature on
privilege, unconscious bias, and microaggressions emphasizes these
factors, and diversity training has been designed to address them,
albeit with limited success.4 The persistent lack of diversity,
however, may be more explicable as a design feature of flawed
management practices. A 2020 Nasdaq report, for example, links
greater diversity to the lesser incidence of opaque governance
procedures, earnings manipulation, weak internal controls, and
securities fraud.5 Other studies find that lack of diversity is often
3. See, e.g., Yaron Nili, Beyond the Numbers: Substantive Gender Diversity in
Boardrooms, 94 IND. L.J. 145, 180–82 (2019) (arguing that when women serve on
corporate boards, their tenure is shorter than that of their male counterparts, they
are overextended, and they lack clout). Reversing these patterns can serve as a
metric for genuine corporate reform.
4. Indeed, Mike Selmi questions just how “unconscious” unconscious bias is.
Michael Selmi, The Paradox of Implicit Bias and a Plea for a New Narrative, 50 ARIZ.
ST. L.J. 193, 197–98 (2018) (“Rather than defining implicit bias as unconscious and
uncontrollable . . . it should be treated as one possible step, usually the initial step,
in a more elaborate deliberative process.”); see also Jessica A. Clarke, Explicit Bias,
113 NW. U. L. REV. 505, 523–47 (2018) (exploring the ways in which courts overlook
explicit bias and accept justifications for it); Frank Dobbin & Alexandra Kalev, Why
Doesn’t Diversity Training Work?: The Challenge for Industry and Academia,
ANTHROPOLOGY NOW, Sept. 2018, at 48, 49 [https://perma.cc/U5ZH-S7NZ] (“There is
ample evidence that training alone does not change attitudes or behavior, or not by
much and not for long. In their review of 985 studies of antibias interventions, Paluck
and Green found little evidence that training reduces bias. In their review of 31
organizational studies using pretest/posttest assessments or a control group, Kulik
and Roberson identified 27 that documented improved knowledge of, or attitudes
toward, diversity, but most found small, short-term improvements on one or two of
the items measured. In their review of 39 similar studies, Bezrukova, Joshi and Jehn
identified only five that examined long-term effects on bias, two showing positive
effects, two negative, and one no effect.”).
5. The Nasdaq Stock Mkt. LLC, supra note 1, at 9.
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associated with indifferent, harassing, or bullying bosses.6 What
these negative workplace attributes have in common is that they
can also be used to enhance top executive power and compensation
at the expense of other corporate objectives.7 The instrumental case
for diversity maintains that where such attributes, which involve
conflicts of interest between top management and longer-term
company interests, exist, an emphasis on greater diversity is also
likely to make it easier to root out such practices because the lack
of diversity is a sign of those practices.
The third question involves how our instrumental case relates
to the moral and more traditional business cases for diversity. The
simple answer is that the moral case treats diversity as an end in
itself, a necessary part of a just society.8 The traditional business
case for diversity maintains that, even if diversity is not morally or
legally compelled, it is a positive good that businesses should
embrace because it will promote their own financial interests.9 The
instrumental case we are making in this Article exists alongside the
moral and business cases. It argues that the promotion of diversity
can in some cases become a tool for advancing corporate interests
separate from diversity itself. The business case for diversity
suggests, for example, that greater diversity may be beneficial in
appealing to a more diverse customer base or in recruiting
employees who prefer to work in diverse environments.10 The
instrumental case, in contrast, suggests that diversity may also be
useful in countering illegal or unethical practices that require a
carefully selected crony network to stay hidden.11 Such an
6. Cf. Jennifer L. Berdahl, Marianne Cooper, Peter Glick, Robert W. Livingston
& Joan C. Williams, Work as a Masculinity Contest, 74 J. SOC. ISSUES 422, 422 (2018)
(identifying workplaces as sites of “masculinity contests”); Kenneth Matos, Olivia
(Mandy) O’Neill & Xue Lei, Toxic Leadership and the Masculinity Contest Culture:
How “Win or Die” Cultures Breed Abusive Leadership, 74 J. SOC. ISSUES 500, 502–04
(2018); Shannon L. Rawski & Angela Workman-Stark, Masculinity Contest Cultures
in Policing Organizations and Recommendations for Training Interventions, 74 J.
SOC. ISSUES 607, 609–12 (2018).
7. See, e.g., June Carbone & William K. Black, The Problem with Predators, 43
SEATTLE U. L. REV. 441, 468–71 (2020) [hereinafter Carbone & Black, The Problem
with Predators] (describing how CEOs acquire greater power vis-à-vis boards by
producing short-term earnings gains).
8. See David B. Wilkins, From “Separate Is Inherently Unequal” to “Diversity Is
Good for Business”: The Rise of Market-Based Diversity Arguments and the Fate of
the Black Corporate Bar, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1548, 1599–1600 (2004).
9. See, e.g., Douglas E. Brayley & Eric S. Nguyen, Good Business: A MarketBased Argument for Law Firm Diversity, 34 J. LEGAL PRO. 1, 2 (2009).
10. Id. at 25.
11. See, e.g., Kristin N. Johnson, Banking on Diversity: Does Gender Diversity
Improve Financial Firms’ Risk Oversight?, 70 SMU L. REV. 327, 376 (2017)
(describing the value of diversity in valuing groupthink); cf. Carbone & Black, The
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argument does not replace the moral or business cases; it brackets
them. Instead, it suggests a more fine-tuned analysis should regard
the presence or absence of diversity as a signal tied to specific
management practices.
To give an example of the difference, consider the traditional
obstacles to diversity: women’s greater family responsibilities or an
emphasis on pathways into the executive suite that have
historically not been open to underrepresented minorities or
women. The moral case for diversity maintains that firms have an
obligation to devise ways to overcome these obstacles. The business
case suggests firms should reconsider whether it is in their interests
to continue to maintain such narrow pathways to advancement,
trading off traditional notions of merit for more representative
inclusion of different groups. The instrumental case, instead, asks
whether the presumed advantages of these factors are real. In the
case of the emphasis on long hours at work, for example, a growing
literature suggests the emphasis on long hours may result less from
employer needs and more from an emphasis on zero sum (or often
negative sum) competition that becomes an end in itself.12 The three
rationales may come together to question the emphasis on long or
unpredictable work schedules as a barrier to the greater inclusion
of women; the instrumental case, however, focuses greater
attention on when and how such an emphasis is counterproductive.
This Article will provide a framework for answering these
questions by examining changes in business practices over the last
forty years. During that time period, large corporations have shifted
from the era of the “corporation man,” which featured large, secure,
predictable, and largely homogenous business environments, to the
era of the “tournament,” that is, business environments that place
greater emphasis on internal competition and short-term measures
of performance.13 This Article will suggest that tournament-like
Problem with Predators, supra note 7, at 460 (describing the way white collar
criminals create seeming legitimacy for their predatory business practices); June
Carbone, Naomi Cahn & Nancy Levit, Women, Rule-Breaking, and the Triple Bind,
87 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1105, 1109 (2019) [hereinafter Carbone, Cahn & Levit, The
Triple Bind] (“[C]ompanies use intensely competitive bonus systems to produce
insular ‘young boys’ clubs’ that promote a culture of rule-breaking; that is, the
management systems deliberately and instrumentally select for alpha males who
will flout the laws that stand in the way of these otherwise profitable business
models.”).
12. See Naomi Cahn, Where Are All the Women Leaders?, FORBES (Mar. 3, 2020),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/naomicahn/2020/03/03/where-are-all-the-womenleaders/?sh=6290f2462ee7 [https://perma.cc/SV74-3T3P].
13. See Naomi Cahn, June Carbone & Nancy Levit, Gender and the Tournament:
Reinventing Antidiscrimination Law in an Age of Inequality, 96 TEX. L. REV. 425,
447–48 (2018) [hereinafter Cahn, Carbone & Levit, Gender and the Tournament].
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workplaces make it harder to maintain diversity—and often
produce worse business outcomes. This analysis will lay the
foundation for a deeper inquiry into the relationship between
diversity and corporate reform.
The focus of this Article is on diversity among the corporate
officers and directors who manage corporations. Outside of
management, corporations often have no diversity “problems;”
indeed, the problem is instead that lower-wage jobs are more likely
to be filled by women and people of color.14
I. Diversity and Corporate Tournaments
Over the last several decades, the prevailing corporate ethos
has become one of shareholder primacy; that is, a focus on shortterm increases in share price to the exclusion of other
considerations.15 A growing critique maintains that too great an
emphasis on short-term metrics is ultimately bad for business.16 In
addition, a different critique to which we have contributed argues
that the practices associated with shareholder primacy, such as
high stakes bonus pay, have also tended to drive women out.17 The
common denominator in these two critiques is the emergence of
winner take all rewards: those calling the shots reorient institutions
so that the CEO, influential shareholders, and a select group
associated with the boss take a disproportionate share of the
company’s resources. This winner-takes-all approach is often at the
expense of other employees, customers, and the company’s longterm health. In this Section, we will describe the shift towards the
winner-takes-all approach and explain why they may undercut
long-term business performance. Then, we will consider why they
may also be associated with less diversity. Considering the
circumstances in which these factors may simultaneously
undermine both the company prospects and the inclusion of women
may offer new insights into the instrumental case for diversity.

14. See MARTHA ROSS & NICOLE BATEMAN, METRO. POL’Y PROGRAM AT
BROOKINGS, MEET THE LOW-WAGE WORKFORCE 9 (2019), https://www.brookings.edu/
research/meet-the-low-wage-workforce/ [https://perma.cc/YQN5-3KHR]; cf. Noreen
Ahmed, Exposing Wage Theft Without Fear Is Possible and Necessary, NAT’L EMP. L.
PROJECT (Sept. 16, 2019), https://www.nelp.org/blog/exposing-wage-theft-withoutfear-possible-necessary/ [https://perma.cc/S54G-VTDS] (explaining that lower-wage
jobs are correlated with instances of wage theft, which have a disproportionate
impact on women and people of color).
15. See Cahn, Carbone & Levit, Gender and the Tournament, supra note 13, 447–
49.
16. Id. at 449.
17. See id.; Carbone, Cahn & Levit, The Triple Bind, supra note 11, at 1123–28.
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A. Shareholder Primacy, Short-Termism, and Corporate
Boards
An overarching change in corporate management since the
1980s is the reorientation of publicly traded companies to
emphasize short-term gains in share price.18 This shift can be
thought of as involving three components: first, an insistence that
officers and directors consider shareholder interests to the exclusion
of other stakeholders such as customers and employees, and second,
an alignment of executive and shareholder interests through a
restructuring of top executive pay to place greater emphasis on
stock options. As a consequence of the first two changes, the third
component is greater pressure on CEOs to produce short-term
results.19 Each of these factors, both individually and collectively,
has been the subject of extensive management critiques for reasons
unrelated to diversity.
First, while shareholder interests can be diverse, shareholder
primacy has tended to identify shareholder interests with shortterm fluctuations in share price. This has been true for a number of
reasons. The most immediate reason is that corporate boards
measure CEO success in terms of their ability to generate earnings,
which in turn pushes up share price.20 Boards exercise oversight in
the name of protecting shareholder interests.21 As a practical
matter, therefore, a CEO who has a strong initial run “creates

18. See June Carbone & Nancy Levit, The Death of the Firm, 101 MINN. L. REV.
963, 966, 1003 (2017) [hereinafter Carbone & Levit, The Death of the Firm].
19. See Carbone & Black, The Problem with Predators, supra note 7, at 468–70;
id. at 463–64 (“[T]o better align management and shareholder interests, top
management compensation packages began to emphasize incentive pay tied
overwhelmingly to stock options. Between 1993 and 2014, the percentage of CEO
compensation attributable to incentive pay increased from 35% to 85%, and CEOs
also faced greater risk of dismissal if share prices did not increase. The overall
disparities in the pay of top executives at the same company increased, and between
1981 and 2013, the pay ratio between CEOs and average wage workers grew from
42:1 to 331:1.”).
20. See, e.g., Donald C. Langevoort, Resetting the Corporate Thermostat: Lessons
from the Recent Financial Scandals About Self-Deception, Deceiving Others and the
Design of Internal Controls, 93 GEO. L.J. 285, 295 (2004) (“The preference of the
firm’s current shareholders is for increasing profitability reflected in either
dividends or stock price, which sometimes is aided by concealing the truth rather
than revealing it.”); id. at 313.
21. See Stephen M. Bainbridge, Director Primacy: The Means and Ends
of Corporate Governance, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 547, 563–65 (2003); Yaron
Nili, Horizontal Directors, 114 NW. U. L. REV. 1179, 1188 (2020) (“[W]hile most of the
operational decision-making can be, and is, delegated to management, the board is
still required to be an active participant in some of the more important managerial
business decisions, such as mergers, stock issuance, and changes to company
governance documents.”).
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greater autonomy by both enhancing his bargaining position over
time and increasing the cognitive commitment of the board to
him.”22 A decline in share price, on the other hand, can and has led
to the CEO’s termination.23 Activist hedge funds have been
enforcing this system by waiting in the wings, ready to buy up stock,
acquire board membership, and push through changes that boost
the value of their typically short-term investments in the
company.24
Second, to more closely match management and shareholder
short-term interests, a higher proportion of CEO pay is now tied to
stock options that increase in value with reported earnings.25
Better alignment increases the incentives for CEOs to focus their
efforts on boosting short-term earnings and share prices.26 CEOs, in
turn, have implemented bonus pay systems for top executives that
align executive incentives with CEO objectives.27 Critics allege that
high stakes bonus pay has been associated with earnings
management, accounting irregularities, increased use of stock
buybacks, and outright fraud.28 Indeed, a major advantage of such

22. Langevoort, supra note 20, at 313.
23. See Andrew C.W. Lund & Gregg D. Polsky, The Diminishing Returns of
Incentive Pay in Executive Compensation Contracts, 87 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 677,
695 (2011) (indicating that CEO terminations can be linked to share price
performance).
24. See Brian R. Cheffins & John Armour, The Past, Present, and Future of
Shareholder Activism by Hedge Funds, 37 J. CORP. L. 51, 59–61, 75, 80–82 (2011)
(noting that publicly traded companies experience pressure to increase short-term
earnings because of the role of hedge funds and other activist investors). As Virginia
Harper Ho notes, however, there are two other camps of shareholder activists:
“public pension funds, labor unions, religious orders, and individual ‘gadflies,’ whose
activism has often aligned with particular values and interests . . . [and] mainstream
institutional investors like Vanguard and Fidelity [that] have generally voted with
management . . . .” Virginia Harper Ho, From Public Policy to Materiality: NonFinancial Reporting, Shareholder Engagement, and Rule 14a-8’s Ordinary Business
Exception, 76 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1231, 1236 (2019).
25. See Carbone & Black, The Problem with Predators, supra note 7, at 444, 463–
66.
26. See Lynne L. Dallas, Short-Termism, the Financial Crisis, and Corporate
Governance, 37 J. CORP. L. 265, 320–21 (2012) (describing how executive
compensation increases emphasis on short-term increases in share price).
27. See Lynne L. Dallas, A Preliminary Inquiry into the Responsibility of
Corporations and Their Officers and Directors for Corporate Climate: The Psychology
of Enron’s Demise, 35 RUTGERS L.J. 1, 37–39 (2003) [hereinafter Dallas, Enron]
(describing how Enron management used its bonus system to reorient company
behavior in counterproductive and unethical ways); see, e.g., Lynn A. Stout, Killing
Conscience: The Unintended Behavioral Consequences of “Pay for Performance”, 39
J. CORP. L. 525, 534 (2014) (describing bonus systems and concluding that they are
associated with “earning manipulations, accounting frauds, and excessive risktaking”).
28. See Shane A. Johnson, Harley E. Ryan, Jr. & Yisong S. Tian, Managerial
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bonus systems is that they allow CEOs to emphasize their desired
metrics while looking the other way at how subordinates achieve
their results.29 Critics call the system “plausible deniability,” as
executives can use bonuses to signal the desired behavior without
complicity in the resulting illegal, unethical, or shortsighted tactics
that executives use to produce results.30 The association of modern
executive compensation with abusive practices has become
sufficiently widespread now that some of the original supporters of
the move to bonus pay have withdrawn their support.31
Third, the single-minded focus on short-term shareholder
primacy has led to concern about the effect on other stakeholders.
For example, large investors like BlackRock have begun to pay
greater attention to environmental issues, reasoning that climate
change may affect the world economy in ways that share price
fluctuations in individual companies may not reflect.32
Taken together, the combination of a short-term focus, the use
of incentive pay to disguise CEO objectives and company health,
and the failure to recognize more generalized challenges to global
markets have persuaded many critics that corporate reform is in
Incentives and Corporate Fraud: The Sources of Incentives Matter, 13 REV. FIN. 115,
115–16 (2009) (“[M]anagers with larger linear incentives may be more likely to
commit fraud in an attempt to avoid severe price declines.”); Sharon Hannes &
Avraham Tabbach, Executive Stock Options: The Effects of Manipulation on Risk
Taking, 38 J. CORP. L. 533, 545 (2013) (discussing the link between “executive
incentive compensation, excessive risk taking,” and the pressure to manipulate
reported outcomes to influence share price); Lucian Arye Bebchuk, Jesse M. Fried &
David I. Walker, Managerial Power and Rent Extraction in the Design of Executive
Compensation, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 751, 751 (2002) (arguing that executive ability to
set compensation facilitates the ability to benefit from short-term and “rent
extraction” strategies).
29. See Carbone & Black, The Problem with Predators, supra note 7, at 461–62.
30. See Charles W. Calomiris, The Subprime Turmoil: What’s Old, What’s New,
and What’s Next, J. STRUCTURED FIN., Spring 2009, at 6, 16 [https://perma.cc/JCR47LZR] (describing how plausible deniability allowed those overseeing mortgagebacked securities to escape accountability during the financial crisis); see also Cahn,
Carbone & Levit, Gender and the Tournament, supra note 13, at 450–51 (describing
how bonus systems can incentivize behaviors that cut against companies’ ethics
standards).
31. Michael C. Jensen & Kevin J. Murphy, Remuneration: Where We’ve Been,
How We Got to Here, What Are the Problems, and How to Fix Them 44–45 (Harv.
Bus. Sch., Working Paper No. 44, 2004), http://ssrn.com/abstract=561305
[https://perma.cc/2NEE-NAVR] (discussing how equity-based compensation led to
unwise acquisitions, increased risk, “aggressive accounting,” and even corporate
fraud).
32. See Michal Barzuza, Quinn Curtis & David H. Webber, Shareholder Value(s):
Index Fund ESG Activism and the New Millennial Corporate Governance, 93 S. CAL.
L. REV. 1243, 1272–74 (2020) (describing how BlackRock started to emphasize
environmental considerations, including the impact of climate disruption and
potential regulatory reactions, in its portfolio as early as 2015).
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order. These critics observe that CEOs can often produce an
immediate boost in share prices by cutting labor costs through
layoffs or reductions in training, slashing investment in research
and equipment, engaging in stock buybacks, or concealing negative
information.33 All of these actions have been known to increase
short-term share prices; all have the potential to threaten
companies’ medium to long-term interests.34 The Corporate
Roundtable and other influential actors have started to back away
from that short-term shareholder focus, arguing that it is
economically destructive.35

33. Langevoort, supra note 20, at 295 (“The preference of the
firm’s current shareholders is for increasing profitability reflected in either
dividends or stock price, which sometimes is aided by concealing the truth rather
than revealing it.”); see William Lazonick, The Financialization of the U.S.
Corporation: What Has Been Lost, and How It Can Be Regained, 36 SEATTLE U. L.
REV. 857, 888–89 (2013) (calling stock buybacks “weapons of value destruction” and
arguing executives who make these corporate allocation decisions use stock buybacks
to boost their companies’ stock prices and manage quarterly earnings “because,
through their stock-based pay, they are personally incentivized to make these
allocation decisions”); see also Dallas, supra note 26, at 280 (describing CEO
willingness to decrease research, development, and marketing expenses even if it
would hurt the firm’s medium to long term prospects).
34. See Carbone, Cahn & Levit, The Triple Bind, supra note 11, at 1115; see also
Mark Desjardine & Rodolphe Durand, Activist Hedge Funds: Good for Some, Bad for
Others?, HEC (Mar. 30, 2021), https://www.hec.edu/en/knowledge/articles/activisthedge-funds-good-some-bad-others#:~:text=While%20we%20typically%20think%20
of,with%20an%20aim%20to%20make [https://perma.cc/H2LJ-RQC5] (showing that
while such strategies boost share price in the short run, they depress it over time).
35. See Business Roundtable Redefines the Purpose of a Corporation to Promote
‘An Economy That Serves All Americans’, BUS. ROUNDTABLE (Aug. 19, 2019),
https://www.businessroundtable.org/business-roundtable-redefines-the-purpose-ofa-corporation-to-promote-an-economy-that-serves-all-americans [https://perma.cc/
XDL2-7T5S]; Press Release, Bus. Roundtable, Statement on the Purpose of a
Corporation (Feb. 2021), https://system.businessroundtable.org/app/uploads/sites/
5/2021/02/BRT-Statement-on-the-Purpose-of-a-Corporation-Feburary-2021compressed.pdf [https://perma.cc/QR48-MA6V]. Martin Lipton (of Wachtell Lipton
Rosen & Katz) argued at the World Economic Forum in 2016 that “[a] short-term
mindset in managing and investing in businesses has become pervasive and is
profoundly destructive to the long-term health of the economy.” MARTIN LIPTON,
WORLD ECON. F., THE NEW PARADIGM A ROADMAP FOR AN IMPLICIT CORPORATE
GOVERNANCE PARTNERSHIP BETWEEN CORPORATIONS AND INVESTORS TO ACHIEVE
SUSTAINABLE
LONG-TERM
INVESTMENT
AND
GROWTH
5
(2016),
https://www.wlrk.com/webdocs/wlrknew/AttorneyPubs/WLRK.25960.16.pdf
[https://perma.cc/32BX-VZ9J]. See also Nadelle Grossman, Turning a Short-Term
Fling into a Long-Term Commitment: Board Duties in a New Era, 43 U. MICH. J.L.
REFORM 905, 906 (2010) (“[B]oard short-termism also seems to be due to some
investors with short investment horizons who use activism to influence boards to
make decisions that yield short-term returns despite the longer-term impairing
effects those decisions might have on the corporate enterprise.”).
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In addition, some investors now pay increased attention to
environmental, social, and governance (ESG) factors.36 In 2020,
Moody’s Investors Service announced that it “expect[ed] ESG
considerations to be of growing importance in [its] assessment of
issuer credit quality.”37 Moody’s analysts wrote, “[w]hile our ratings
have always reflected our views of ESG risks, the materiality of key
environmental and social issues continues to increase.”38 ESG
investing often combines two different motives: some funds market
ESG investments in an effort to appeal to socially conscious
investors.39 Other investors emphasizing ESG factors maintain that
share prices do not fully take into account medium-to-long-term
risks arising from greater societal inequality, potential regulatory
responses to inequitable business practices, or the inevitable
transition to new energy sources.40
The rise in ESG investing also produces greater emphasis on
diversity.41 Particularly in the wake of #MeToo and Black Lives
Matter protests, the failure to attend to diversity issues can be a
36. Caleb Mutua, ESG Is Increasingly Important in Credit Ratings, Moody’s
Says, BLOOMBERG (Apr. 14, 2020), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/202004-14/esg-is-increasingly-important-in-credit-ratings-moody-s-says
[https://perma.cc/T4FW-JJEX].
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Robert G. Eccles & Svetlana Klimenko, The Investor Revolution, HARV. BUS.
REV., May–June 2019, at 107, 111, https://hbr.org/2019/05/the-investor-revolution
[https://perma.cc/759V-CNY6] (describing the increased demand for ESG investment
options as linked to people’s focus on nonfinancial outcomes that are “mak[ing] the
world a better place”).
40. See Max M. Schanzenbach & Robert H. Sitkoff, Reconciling Fiduciary Duty
and Social Conscience: The Law and Economics of ESG Investing by a Trustee, 72
STAN. L. REV. 381, 398 (2020) (distinguishing between the different motivations for
ESG investing and arguing that a “risk-return ESG analysis of a fossil fuel company
might conclude that the company’s litigation and regulatory risks are
underestimated by its share price”); see also Stavros Gadinis & Amelia
Miazad, Corporate Law and Social Risk, 73 VAND. L. REV. 1401, 1401–02 (2020)
(concluding that “[s]ocial risk has proven highly destructive for corporate value even
when the company’s key failure is not violating laws, as the recent crises at Facebook
and Uber demonstrate”).
41. See, e.g., Veronica Root Martinez & Gina-Gail S. Fletcher, Equality Metrics,
130 YALE L.J. 869, 877, 885 (2021); see also Afra Afsharipour, Bias, Identity and
M&A, WIS. L. REV. 471, 488 (2020) (“Shareholder pressure is also forcing boards to
confront diversity head on.”); Lisa M. Fairfax, All on Board? Board Diversity Trends
Reflect Signs of Promise and Concern, 87 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1031, 1032 (2018)
(explaining the increased support from investors “engaged in specific direct action
aimed at pressuring corporations to diversify their boards”); Barzuza, supra note 32,
at 1265 (“[I]ndex funds are typically reticent followers when it comes to corporate
governance reforms, but when the subject matter of activism turns from conventional
governance reforms to demands for increased gender diversity on boards, index funds
have been notably outspoken, both in communications directed primarily at
corporate managers and in marketing efforts directed at the general public.”).
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risk factor for major companies on the same order as energy
transition and accounting irregularities.42 But, as we will show
below, the failure to attend to diversity also provides a fartherreaching barometer of corporate governance issues.
B. Toxic Management Drives Women Out
In the shareholder primacy era, management styles have
changed in ways that make diversity hard to maintain. CEOs have
become more likely to be hired from outside a company, and CEO
tenure has declined.43 Given the pressure to accomplish quick
results, CEOs may adopt top-down management systems, the use
of reductionist metrics to measure success, or high stakes bonus
systems that incentivize management priorities.44 The CEO’s focus,
especially a CEO coming from outside the company or one with a
mandate to produce immediate results, may be on how to gain
control of what can be large, sprawling, and bureaucratic
institutions. The goal may be to outflank the established players in
the organization to find those willing to put the CEO’s priorities
first, especially where the CEO seeks to slash expenses, cut
employment, or shake up the corporate mission. High-stakes bonus
systems can be an attractive way to do so.
Jack Welch, the GE CEO identified with the modern era of
corporate management, was a master in imposing his will on a large
bureaucracy.45 He developed an innovative management training
program that regularly moved executives from division to division
and an executive compensation system that introduced high-stake
bonuses.46 The company regularly ranked employees against each
42. See, e.g., Kate Harrison, How Smart Employers Should Respond to #MeToo
in 2019, FORBES (Apr. 3, 2019), https://www.forbes.com/sites/kateharrison/2019/
04/03/how-smart-employers-should-respond-to-metoo-in-2019/?sh=7c3c6e3a7f0d
[https://perma.cc/F5Y2-GKWE] (describing the potential for “bad press” because of a
lackluster response to #MeToo concerns); see also Martinez & Fletcher, supra note
41, at 885 (“[E]mployee and investor pressure for corporate action to address racial
inequity remains high, motivating corporations to stay the course in their backing of
the Black Lives Matter movement.”).
43. See Curt Nickisch, Outsider CEOs Are on the Rise at the World’s Biggest
Companies, HARV. BUS. REV. (Apr. 19, 2016), https://hbr.org/2016/04/outsider-ceosare-on-the-rise-at-the-worlds-biggest-companies
[https://perma.cc/2EA3-7W9Z];
Carbone & Levit, The Death of the Firm, supra note 18, at 1002 n.196.
44. Carbone, Cahn & Levit, The Triple Bind, supra note 11, at 1109, 1115–16.
45. Jia Lynn Yang, Jack Welch, Corporate America’s ‘Manager of the Century,’
Dies at 84, WASH. POST (Mar. 2, 2020), https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/
obituaries/jack-welch-corporate-americas-manager-of-the-century-dies-at84/2020/03/02/3cd83f0e-5c8c-11ea-9055-5fa12981bbbf_story.html [https://perma.cc/
3QAK-TYXN].
46. See Jack Welch, Jack Welch: ‘Rank-and-Yank’? That’s Not How It’s Done,
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other, identifying about twenty percent who were groomed for
promotion and notifying the bottom ten percent that they were at
risk of dismissal.47 He repeated the process each year, rewarding
some with stock options that could be incredibly lucrative as the
company’s share price increased, and encouraging the everchanging group receiving low marks to consider other
employment.48 For a time, his system proved incredibly influential
with forty-nine percent of companies saying they used a form of
stack ranking in a 2009 study done by the Institute for Corporate
Productivity.49 The specific system has since fallen out of favor;50
still, variable pay remains the norm, with bonus pay in the form of
stock options or year-end cash grants often dwarfing base pay for
higher level employees in tech, finance, and other fields.51 Such
awards, as Jack Welch emphasized, allow corporate CEOs to
incentivize their priorities.
Introducing such high-stakes bonus systems changes firm
dynamics. Lynne Dallas observes that such systems, particularly
where employees feel they are in competition with each other,
produces a greater emphasis on self-interest, higher levels of
distrust that undermine teamwork, greater homogeneity in the
selection of corporate management, less managerial accountability,

WALL ST. J. (Nov. 14, 2013), https://www.wsj.com/articles/8216rankandyank8217that8217s-not-how-it8217s-done-1384473281 [https://perma.cc/DD8Y-QT67].
47. See NAOMI CAHN, JUNE CARBONE, & NANCY LEVIT, SHAFTED: WHY WOMEN
LOSE IN A WINNER-TAKE-ALL WORLD ch. 2 (forthcoming 2022 Simon & Schuster);
Welch, supra note 46; Carbone, Cahn & Levit, The Triple Bind, supra note 11, at
1115.
48. See Carbone, Cahn & Levit, The Triple Bind, supra note 11, at 1115–16;
Yang, supra note 45.
49. See Cahn, Carbone & Levit, Gender and the Tournament, supra note 13, at
451 n.136; see also Chris Hardesty, Should I Rank My Employees?, WALL ST. J. (Apr.
7, 2009), http://guides.wsj.com/management/recruiting-hiring-and-firing/should-irank-my-employees/ [https://perma.cc/7Q99-AULE] (adapting ALAN MURRAY, THE
WALL STREET JOURNAL ESSENTIAL GUIDE TO MANAGEMENT: LASTING LESSONS FROM
THE BEST LEADERSHIP MINDS OF OUR TIME (2010) and describing “a survey of more
than 200 human resources professionals” from large companies where “more than
half . . . used forced ranking”).
50. See, e.g., Carbone, Cahn & Levit, The Triple Bind, supra note 11, at 1116–17
(“[C]ompanies have moved away from rigidly ordered approaches, particularly those
mandating termination of a fixed percentage of the workforce every year, but
competitive ranking systems that compare employees to each other remain
common.”).
51. See LAWRENCE MISHEL & JORI KANDRA, ECON. POL’Y INST., CEO
COMPENSATION HAS GROWN 1,322% SINCE 1978: CEOS WERE PAID 351 TIMES AS
MUCH
AS
A
TYPICAL
WORKER
IN
2020
1,
5–10
(2021),
https://www.epi.org/publication/ceo-pay-in-2020/ [https://perma.cc/XE3D-HG9X]; see
also Carbone, Cahn & Levit, The Triple Bind, supra note 11, at 1115 (explaining the
reliance on performance pay and stock options).
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and more politicized decision-making.52 In short, “supposedly
meritocratic bonus systems have been found to replicate many of
the attributes of old boys’ clubs that protect insiders at the expense
of outsiders.”53
Even without the extremes of an Enron or a GE, competitive
workplaces can lead to “masculinity contest cultures”54 that pit
employees against each other in high stakes, negative sum
competitions that often lower morale and increase turnover.55 Such
cultures emphasize the internal competition between employees,
which may take the form of artificial measures of devotion to the job
such as long hours. over more job-related performance measures
tied to productivity.56 These cultures often select for bosses who
thrive in such competitive environments and bully or harass their
subordinates, particularly women and less traditionally masculine
men.57 Where such cultures take hold, turnover, sexual
harassment, and demoralization increase—and diversity may be
harder to maintain.58
Critics of performance pay emphasize that these systems also
change the characteristics of the employees who rise to the top.
Such systems become more likely to select for narcissism and
overconfidence bias and less likely to select for humility, honesty,
or empathy.59 Studies find that greater power diminishes functional
52. Dallas, Enron, supra note 27, at 37.
53. Cahn, Carbone & Levit, Gender and the Tournament, supra note 13, at 452.
54. See Berdahl et al., supra note 6. See also Carbone & Black, The Problem with
Predators, supra note 7, at 479 (noting the gendering of competitive workplace
cultures and emphasizing “the ways that the terms of competition are often artificial
and increase male dominance in the workplace . . . where the celebration of extreme
masculine traits becomes an end in itself, defining the workplace ideal in
stereotypically male terms.”).
55. See Berdahl et al., supra note 6, at 429 (observing that masculinity contests
are “most prevalent—and vicious—in male-dominated occupations where extreme
resources (fame, power, wealth) or precarious resources . . . are at stake . . .”).
56. Id. at 430 (observing that “men compete at work for dominance by showing
no weakness, demonstrating a single-minded focus on professional success,
displaying physical endurance and strength, and engaging in cut-throat
competition”).
57. Id. at 428 (“The need to repeatedly prove masculinity can lead men to behave
aggressively, embrace risky behaviors, sexually harass women (or other men), and
express homophobic attitudes, when men feel that their masculinity is threatened.”).
58. See Peter Glick, Jennifer L. Berdahl & Natalya M. Alonso, Development and
Validation of the Masculinity Contest Culture Scale, 74 J. SOC. ISSUES 449, 449, 462
(2018).
59. Tomas Chamorro-Premuzic, Why Do So Many Incompetent Men Become
Leaders?, HARV. BUS. REV. (Aug. 22, 2013), https://hbr.org/2013/08/why-do-so-manyincompetent-men [https://perma.cc/9QBH-ZW27] (observing that “when it comes to
leadership, the only advantage that men have over women . . . is the fact that
manifestations of hubris—often masked as charisma or charm—are commonly
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empathy—higher social status and situational power are
“associated with a reduced tendency to comprehend how other
individuals see the world, think about the world, and feel about the
world.”60 It turns out that traits like narcissism describe a distinct
subset of the general population that is much more likely to be
male61—and more likely to discriminate against outsiders.62
Accordingly, corporate environments that place greater
emphasis on zero (or worse, negative) sum competition systems
introduce a reinforcing set of effects. As law professor Donald
Langevoort explained, “traits such as over-optimism, an inflated
sense of self-efficacy and a deep capacity for ethical selfdeception . . . are survival traits, not weaknesses, in a very
Darwinian business world.”63 Such business worlds tend to select
not just for men, but for a certain type of male leader—a type of
leader who is also more likely than other men to drive women out.64
And while bonus pay systems vary, they tend to be associated with
greater gender pay disparities, further affecting the ability to retain
female employees.65

mistaken for leadership potential, and that these occur much more frequently in men
than in women”).
60. Adam D. Galinsky, Joe C. Magee, M. Ena Inesi & Deborah H. Gruenfeld,
Power and Perspectives Not Taken, 17 PSYCHOL. SCI. 1068, 1072 (2006); see also
DACHER KELTNER, THE POWER PARADOX 101 (2016) (identifying the four “[a]buses of
power,” including power that “leads to empathy deficits and diminished moral
sentiments . . . self-serving
impulsivity . . . incivility
and
disrespect . . . [and] . . . narratives of exceptionalism”).
61. See Emily Grijalva, Daniel A. Newman, Louis Tay, M. Brent Donnellan, P.D.
Harms, Richard W. Robins & Taiyi Yan, Gender Differences in Narcissism: A MetaAnalytic Review, 141 PSYCHOL. BULL. 261, 280 (2015) (observing that men display a
type of narcissism more affiliated with exploiting others and a sense of entitlement
than women).
62. Berdahl et al., supra note 6, at 435 (concluding that those who thrive in such
environments tend to identify with the workers who have the same traits they see in
themselves, and to exploit others’ weaknesses, leading to the “exclusion and
harassment toward historically disadvantaged groups and men with resistant
masculinities”).
63. Langevoort, supra note 20, at 288.
64. See Stout, supra note 27, at 529 (“Once relatively selfish actors come to
dominate a workplace, less-selfish employees leave, and the employees who remain
start acting in a more purely self-interested and opportunistic fashion.”); see also
Berdahl et al., supra note 6, at 432 (explaining how workplace “male masculinity
contests” lead to winners and losers, typically at the expense of women and men of
marginalized backgrounds, as men dominate underrepresented individuals).
65. MITA GOLDAR, CHRISTOPHER RYAN & AHU YILDIRMAZ, ADP RSCH. INST.,
RETHINKING GENDER PAY INEQUITY IN A MORE TRANSPARENT WORLD 2 (2020);
Stefania Albanesi, How Performance Pay Schemes Make the Gender Gap Worse,
WORLD ECON. F. (Dec. 23, 2015), https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2015/12/howperformance-pay-schemes-make-the-gender-gap-worse/
[https://perma.cc/896EPFBT].
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The net effect of these environments, which produce cutthroat
corporate cultures, an emphasis on long hours as an end in
themselves, and the promotion of misogynist managers, may
literally be boys’ clubs. The McKinsey/Lean In survey of more than
300 firms and 40,000 employees found that the percentage of
women decreases at every step along the management pipeline,
with women beginning at 47% at the entry level and ending at 21%
of the C-Suite positions.66
The analysis above suggests that the presence of women—and
often other underrepresented groups—in upper management is
likely to be associated with better firm financial performance
because of the dynamic described above. The most pernicious
management techniques, such as earnings management, stock
buybacks,67 and other practices focused on the short term at the
expense of a company’s long-term health, depend on the CEO’s
ability to enlist the support of a small group of insiders to subvert
standard business practices.68 The CEO’s most common way of
identifying compatriots is through high-stakes incentive pay that
allows the CEO to signal the desired performance and reward it

66. RACHEL THOMAS, MARIANNE COOPER, GINA CARDAZONE, KATE URBAN, ALI
BOHRER, MADISON LONG, LAREINA YEE, ALEXIS KRIVKOVICH, JESS HUANG, SARA
PRINCE, ANKUR KUMAR & SARAH COURY, MCKINSEY & CO., WOMEN IN THE
WORKPLACE 2020, at 8 (2020), https://wiw-report.s3.amazonaws.com/Women_in_the
_Workplace_2020.pdf [https://perma.cc/HTM6-UQFJ]; see also Tamara Lytle,
Closing the Gender Pay Gap, HR MAG. (June 4, 2019), https://www.shrm.org/hrtoday/news/hr-magazine/summer2019/Pages/closing-the-gender-pay-gap.aspx
[https://perma.cc/3BBY-5YSM] (explaining how reducing gender disparities in pay
helps retain more women).
67. William Lazonick, Mustafa Erdem Sakinç & Matt Hopkins, Why Stock
Buybacks Are Dangerous for the Economy, HARV. BUS. REV. (Jan. 7, 2020),
https://hbr.org/2020/01/why-stock-buybacks-are-dangerous-for-the-economy
[https://perma.cc/XCT4-WVLG] (“With the majority of their compensation coming
from stock options and stock awards, senior corporate executives have used openmarket repurchases to manipulate their companies’ stock prices to their own
benefit . . . .”).
68. Carbone & Black, The Problem with Predators, supra note 7, at 456–57
(describing the role of the CEO in creating “criminogenic” environments). This is
particularly true where the conduct involves plausible deniability with respect to
illegal or unethical conduct. Id. at 455, 462 (explaining how corporate cultures may
“facilitate predation and rule breaking, if not necessarily outright criminality . . . .
Those engaged in predation often create similar mechanisms within firms that
provide incentives to engage in predatory practices while allowing senior officers and
directors to maintain plausible deniability for the consequences”); see also id. at 468
n.167 (describing Enron’s bonus system that encouraged “unethical” behavior). Even
where the conduct is perfectly legal and visible, as with stock buybacks or layoffs, it
may involve neutralizing internal opposition. Id. at 468 (explaining how these
cultures create competitive environments and incentivize hiring decisions benefiting
those who participate in predation).
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without being directly involved in questionable behavior.69 Even if
the company is not engaged in illegal practices, the internal
competition pits employees against each other, undermining
cooperation and trust70 and often leading to the promotion of what
business psychology professor Tomas Chamorro-Premuzic suggests
is too many “incompetent men.”71
II. The Business Case for Diversity
The business case for diversity combines the commitment to
diversity as a moral obligation with the argument that diverse
institutions produce better results.72 Promoting diversity, in
accordance with this argument, produces win-win outcomes;
business entities can “do the right thing” and promote diversity at
no cost to the bottom line. This argument has become increasingly
influential; it has led to efforts to mandate greater diversity on
corporate boards. California and Washington have joined a number
of European and Asian countries requiring a minimum percentage
of women on the governing boards of publicly traded companies.73
Some jurisdictions, including California, have gone further and
added quotas for other underrepresented groups.74
The pure “business case,” however, faces two significant
limitations: first, it is difficult to prove that it is diversity per se that
causes the improvements, and second, even if diversity in fact
69. Id. at 469–70 (describing practices that give subordinates substantial
authority without oversight).
70. Dallas, Enron, supra note 27, at 37.
71. Chamorro-Premuzic, supra note 59, at 172–73.
72. See Vijay Eswaran, The Business Case for Diversity in the Workplace is Now
Overwhelming, WORLD ECON. F. (Apr. 29, 2019), https://www.weforum.org/agenda/
2019/04/business-case-for-diversity-in-the-workplace/
[https://perma.cc/K3TUFPXK].
73. See, e.g., Anne Steele, California Rolls Out Diversity Quotas for Corporate
Boards, WALL ST. J. (Oct. 2, 2020), https://www.wsj.com/articles/california-rolls-outdiversity-quotas-for-corporate-boards-11601507471 [https://perma.cc/Z3T9-4K6D];
Will More States Set Board Diversity Mandates?, LEXISNEXIS (Jan. 13, 2022),
https://www.lexisnexis.com/community/insights/legal/capitol-journal/b/statenet/posts/will-more-states-set-board-diversity-mandates
[https://perma.cc/UJ4P89NU] (Washington, like California, has a diversity mandate, while Illinois,
Maryland, and New York, require that boards disclose demographic information, and
other states have considered mandatory disclosure); see also Jennifer Rankin, EU
Revives Plans for Mandatory Quotas of Women on Company Boards, GUARDIAN (Mar.
5, 2020), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/mar/05/eu-revives-plans-formandatory-quotas-of-women-on-company-boards
[https://perma.cc/2TFT-ELP5]
(describing the European Union’s attempts to impose quotas of women on executive
boards).
74. In this Article, we focus specifically on women; however, portions of our
argument apply to other underrepresented groups, and some of it does not.
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accounts for the outcomes, an explanation is missing for why the
appropriate focus should be on diversity on corporate boards, rather
than in upper management. This Section examines the existing
empirical basis for the business claims in the light of the analysis
in Section I. It describes the empirical work linking diversity to
better business outcomes, acknowledges the methodological
limitations, and concludes, that in explaining outcomes, the links
between the factors that promote pernicious business practices and
those that obstruct efforts to promote greater diversity may be so
deeply intertwined as to be impossible to separate. We conclude that
the factors we describe in Section I therefore form the core of the
instrumental case for diversity.
A. Corporate Boards
There is increasing scholarly inquiry into whether diverse
firms outperform less diverse firms.75 The easy (and uncomplicated)
answer appears to be that diversity pays; more diverse firms,
measured by the percentage of women on corporate boards,
outperform those with fewer women when performance is measured
by factors such as returns to equity or other measures of financial
performance.76 However, the studies are not uniform in finding
better performance, particularly once they attempt to control for
factors other than the mere presence of women. In short, the studies
do not (and we will argue cannot) demonstrate that it is the
presence of women per se that that causes better results.77 Instead,
the arrows linking diversity to better performance may run in
multiple directions. It may be, for example, that better managed
companies are more likely to achieve greater diversity, rather than
diversity leading to better company performance.78 It is also
75. See, e.g., Eswaran, supra note 72; see also Robin J. Ely & David A. Thomas,
Getting Serious About Diversity: Enough Already with the Business Case, HARV. BUS.
REV., Nov.–Dec. 2020, https://hbr.org/2020/11/getting-serious-about-diversityenough-already-with-the-business-case
[https://perma.cc/VV5N-ARY2]
(noting
“rallying cries” for more diversity from CEOs).
76. Alice H. Eagly, When Passionate Advocates Meet Research on Diversity, Does
the Honest Broker Stand a Chance?, 72 J. SOC. ISSUES 199, 201 (2016).
77. See generally id. at 200–03 (explaining that while there is significant
research demonstrating the business value of increased representation of women on
corporate boards, it is challenging to determine if their presence alone is driving
these positive changes).
78. Juan M. Garcia Lara, Beatriz Garcia Osma, Araceli Mora & Mariano Scapin,
The Monitoring Role of Female Directors over Accounting Quality, 45 J. CORP. FIN.
651, 651 (2017) (“Using a large sample of UK firms we find that a larger percentage
of women among independent directors is significantly associated with lower
earnings management practices. However, we show that this relation disappears if
we focus on firms that do not discriminate against women in the access to
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possible that the presence of women is associated with better
management practices for reasons that empirical studies find
difficult to tease out. It is entirely possible that better-run firms hire
more women rather than that the women themselves cause the
better outcomes.79 The research that gained initial attention
focused on corporate boards. Perhaps the most influential of the
early studies is one performed by Catalyst.80 This widely-cited study
examined Fortune 500 companies from 2001 to 2004, determined
the percentage of women on firm boards, and found that companies
in the highest quartile of female representation outperformed those
in the lowest quartile.81 The study, however, simply reported the
differences between the two groups without any effort to include
control variables that might explain the results, and acknowledged
that the correlation could not establish that it was the presence of
women per se that caused the better performance.82 Indeed, the
strength of the relationships did not hold up in Catalyst’s follow-up
study looking at the same relationships during the 2004–2008 time
period.83 A later Credit Suisse Research Institute Study looking at
directorships.”).
79. There are any number of other confounding correlations. For example, most
studies find that large companies have more diversity on boards. Large companies
may become large because they are better run, or they may find it easier to increase
diversity by simply adding more members to their boards. Either way, the presence
of more women may not be the proximate cause of financial performance. See, e.g.,
Eagly, supra note 76, at 202 (noting that large firms have more women on their
boards and that the failure to control for firm size skews the results of some studies);
Deborah L. Rhode & Amanda K. Packel, Diversity on Corporate Boards: How Much
Difference Does Difference Make?, 39 DEL. J. CORP. L. 377, 387 (2014) (explaining
why better or larger firms may be more attractive or have more resources to recruit
women, and thus, may succeed regardless of their presence). It may be that there is
some other type of diversity contributing to this performance. See VIVIAN HUNT,
SARA PRINCE, SUNDIATU DIXON-FYLE, LAREINA YEE, MCKINSEY & CO., DELIVERING
THROUGH DIVERSITY 12 (2018), https://www.mckinsey.com/~/media/mckinsey/
business%20functions/organization/our%20insights/delivering%20through%20diver
sity/delivering-through-diversity_full-report.ashx#:~:text=We%20found%20that
%20companies%20with,likely%20to%20experience%20higher%20profits [https://
perma.cc/W8S7-D44S] (explaining how ethnic/cultural diversity is linked to financial
performance).
80. CATALYST, THE BOTTOM LINE: CORPORATE PERFORMANCE AND WOMEN’S
REPRESENTATION ON BOARDS (2007), https://www.catalyst.org/wp-content/uploads/
2019/01/The_Bottom_Line_Corporate_Performance_and_Womens_Representation_
on_Boards.pdf [https://perma.cc/GKU8-T8MX] (finding a positive relationship
between gender diversity on corporate boards and firm performance).
81. Id.
82. Terry Morehead Dworkin & Cindy A. Schipani, The Role of Gender Diversity
in Corporate Governance, 21 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 105, 107 (2018) (“Some industry
studies, like those conducted by Catalyst, include an explicit footnote that
‘correlation does not prove or imply causation.’”).
83. See Rhode & Packel, supra note 79, at 384 (critiquing the 2007 Catalyst
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more than 2,000 firms across the globe also found that firms with
at least one woman on the board outperformed firms with all-male
boards, reporting that among firms with a market capitalization of
over $10 billion, the firms with female board representation had a
26% better performance in share price.84 This study, too, lacked
controls that might identify causal factors, and some scholars
suspect that larger firms may find it easier to recruit and retain
female board members in ways that skew the results.85 A number
of studies have shown similar correlations.86
While other studies have found a positive relationship using
more sophisticated statistical techniques, some have not.87 Overall,
“an accurate description of this extensive empirical literature is
that correlational findings relating percentages of women on
corporate boards to firms’ financial performance are mixed, and on
the average lean very slightly in the positive direction but only for
companies’ accounting outcomes,” though not necessarily other

study’s limitations).
84. MARY CURTIS, CHRISTINE SCHMID & MARION STUBER, CREDIT SUISSE RSCH.
INST., GENDER DIVERSITY AND CORPORATE PERFORMANCE 12–16 (2012),
https://publications.credit-suisse.com/tasks/render/file/index.cfm?fileid=88EC32A983E8-EB92-9D5A40FF69E66808 [http://perma.cc/TC6U-FAH2].
85. Rhode & Packel, supra note 79, at 385 (noting lack of controls); see also Eagly,
supra note 76, at 202 (speculating on the impact of firm size on studies of this type).
86. For example, Morgan Stanley Capital International found that U.S.
companies with at least three women on the board in 2011 experienced median gains
in return on equity of 10% and earnings per share of 37% over a five year period,
whereas companies that had no female directors in 2011 showed median changes of
-1% in return on equity and -8% in earnings per share over the same five-year period.
See MEGGIN THWING EASTMAN, DAMION RALLIS & GAIA MAZZUCCHELLI, MSCI, THE
TIPPING POINT: WOMEN ON BOARDS AND FINANCIAL PERFORMANCE 3 (2016),
https://www.msci.com/www/research-paper/the-tipping-point-womenon/0538947986 [https://perma.cc/2UX4-CVED] (analyzing U.S. companies that were
constituents of the MSCI World Index for the entire period from July 1, 2011, to June
30, 2016). In addition, a 2018 Calvert report found that, over an eleven-year period,
“companies with [a] higher percentage (%) of Women in Leadership positions (WLP)
and [a] higher % of Women in Board positions (WBD) outperform companies with
the lowest % of WLP and WBD as measured by ratios” for returns on sales, returns
on assets, and returns on equity, noting that 33%–70% was the critical range for
seeing “significant increase[s] in financial performance.” CALVERT IMPACT CAPITAL,
JUST
GOOD
INVESTING
11–12
(2018),
https://assets.ctfassets.net/4oaw9man1yeu/2X1gLdNUrUPFhRAJbAXp1q/205876b
dd2d7e076fce05d5771183dfe/calvert-impact-capital-gender-report.pdf
[https://perma.cc/TYM9-B8X7]. The report also noted that it was not just the number
of women in leadership or in board positions that mattered to returns, but the ratio
of women to men. Id. at 12.
87. See Rhode & Packel, supra note 79, at 384–90 (summarizing studies finding
positive, negative, and nonexistent relationships and ultimately concluding that
“[d]espite increasing references to acceptance of the business case for diversity,
empirical evidence on the issue is mixed”).
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factors such as returns to equity.88 In the international context, the
relationship between female board representation and market
performance is stronger in countries with greater gender equality.89
The varying results reflect differences in methodology, sample
selections, and time periods.90
Relatively few of the studies attempt to tease out causation,
and doing so is difficult. For one thing, “women” are hardly a single
uniform category; the women on one board may not be identical to
the women on other boards. As a general matter, women appointed
“to corporate boards may not in fact differ very much in their values,
experiences, and knowledge from the men.”91 A 2019 study by
Crunchbase, Him for Her, and Kellogg Professor Lauren Rivera of
privately-held companies showed that women on boards are more
likely to be independent members rather than investors or
members tied to management.92 This suggests they are less likely
to be either CEO acolytes or hedge fund activists pushing a short
term agenda.93 Accordingly, any rigorous study would have to look
not just at the overall number of women, but what type of women
produced the best results—any women, the women most similar to
the men, or women who bring distinctly different perspectives?94

88. Eagly, supra note 76, at 203 (defining accounting outcomes as profit and
loss). Compare Paul Gompers & Silpa Kovvali, The Other Diversity Dividend, HARV.
BUS. REV. (July–Aug. 2018), https://hbr.org/2018/07/the-other-diversity-dividend
[https://perma.cc/JAG9-YV7F] (explaining the financial pitfalls of having
homogenous boards and urging more diverse representation, including gender
diversity), with Katherine Klein, Does Gender Diversity on Boards Really Boost
Company
Performance?,
KNOWLEDGE@WHARTON
(May
18,
2017),
https://knowledge.wharton.upenn.edu/article/will-gender-diversity-boards-reallyboost-company-performance/# [https://perma.cc/KAL7-5UUN] (summarizing studies
that “suggest that the relationship between board gender diversity and company
performance is either non-existent (effectively zero) or very weakly positive”).
89. See Corinne Post & Kris Byron, Women on Boards and Firm Financial
Performance: A Meta-Analysis, 58 ACAD. MGMT. J. 1546, 1560 (2015) (explaining that
the relationship may be conditioned by context as it is “more positive” in countries
with “greater gender parity”).
90. Rhode & Packel, supra note 79, at 390 (concluding that “the
empirical research on the effect of board diversity on firm performance is
inconclusive” and “[t]he mixed results reflect the different time periods, countries,
economic environments, types of companies, and measures of diversity and financial
performance”).
91. Klein, supra note 88.
92. Ann Shepherd & Gené Teare, 2020 Study of Gender Diversity on Private
Company Boards, CRUNCHBASE (Mar. 1, 2021), https://news.crunchbase.com/news/
2020-diversity-study-on-private-company-boards/ [https://perma.cc/XTK9-5UA3].
93. Id.; see also Cheffins & Armour, supra note 24, at 80–82.
94. See, e.g., Gompers & Kovvali, supra note 88 (describing how homogenous
venture capital firms tend to be, with Harvard Business School graduates
dominating the firms).
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For another, the most important causal relationships,
including those producing statistically significant results, almost
always involve multiple factors with different effects. This may be
intrinsic in this type of research because of the difficulty in ruling
out endogeneity—the possibility, for example, that an unidentified
factor influenced both better financial performance and greater
diversity.95 Nonetheless, the studies that attempt to identify
potential causal factors are intriguing to the extent they identify
characteristics that may be associated with alternative—and
potentially better—management practices.
The single factor that comes up most frequently in studies of
the relationship between board diversity and firm performance is
increased monitoring. Adams and Ferreira found in 2009 that the
presence of women on corporate boards was associated with better
attendance at board meetings and closer company monitoring.96
The greater monitoring increased the likelihood that CEOs would
resign after poor company performance.97 The same study, however,
95. Eagly, supra note 76, at 202. Investopedia defines an “endogenous variable”
as “a variable in a statistical model that’s changed or determined by its relationship
with other variables within the model.” Will Kenton, Endogenous Variable,
INVESTOPEDIA (Oct. 30, 2020), https://www.investopedia.com/terms/e/endogenousvariable.asp [https://perma.cc/6DJ3-L5E3].
96. Id. at 202 (referring to a study by Renée Adams and Daniel Ferreira and
observing that women board members had higher attendance rates at board
meetings, were more likely to serve on monitoring committees, and these factors
correlated with more monitoring and better performance at low performing
companies); see also Renée B. Adams & Daniel Ferreira, Women in the Boardroom
and Their Impact on Governance and Performance, 94 J. FIN. ECON. 291, 291–92
(2009) (describing the impact on board performance and finding that while more
gender-diverse boards allocated more resources to monitoring, the “average effect of
gender diversity on firm performance is negative. This negative effect is driven by
companies with fewer takeover defenses”).
97. Eagly, supra note 76, at 202 (observing that women board members had
higher attendance rates at board meetings, were more likely to serve on monitoring
committees, and these factors correlated with more monitoring and better
performance at low performing companies). One reason for the correlation between
more gender-diverse boards and increased monitoring is some indication that women
may be more conscientious about attendance and demonstrate greater responsibility
for oversight efforts. Adams and Ferreira note:
Women appear to behave differently than men with respect to our measure of
attendance behavior. Specifically, women are less likely to have attendance
problems than men. Furthermore, the greater the fraction of women on the
board is, the better is the attendance behavior of male directors. Holding other
director characteristics constant, female directors are also more likely to sit on
monitoring-related committees than male directors. In particular, women are
more likely to be assigned to audit, nominating, and corporate governance
committees, although they are less likely to sit on compensation committees
than men are.
Adams & Ferreira, supra note 96, at 292. Other commentators have theorized that
women have been trained toward detail orientation and are more likely to “engage
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also found that increased monitoring was associated with weaker
performance in stronger firms, producing a negative aggregate
effect.98 The authors could not explain the overall negative result,
indicating their inability to rule out investor bias in the stronger
firms—or other unidentified factors—in producing the negative
results.99 The significance of the study, for our purposes, is that it
found that greater monitoring is correlated both with the greater
presence of women and with firm performance (both positively and
negatively).100 What it did not explain was why the factor is
correlated with the greater presence of women, or why it produced
stronger performance in weak firms and weaker performance in
strong firms. What it suggested, however, is that when more women
are present, more monitoring takes place, and more monitoring
correlates with changed business performance.101
Subsequent studies have contributed to the explanations of
why factors associated with greater diversity such as monitoring
might explain the relationship between diversity and stronger firm
performance. In its report advocating gender diversity, Nasdaq
reviewed elements associated with gender diversity that may
explain the impact of diversity on firm performance.102 A 2015
study, for example, found “strong evidence” that a greater number
of women on boards was correlated with less securities fraud.103 A
later study suggested gender diversity is associated with stronger
internal controls over financial reporting.104 Some studies found
correlations between the percentage of women on audit committees
in constructive dissent.” Sandeep Gopalan & Katherine Watson, An Agency
Theoretical Approach to Corporate Board Diversity, 52 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1, 17
(2015).
98. Adams & Ferreira, supra note 96, at 293 (noting that additional monitoring
is counterproductive in well-governed firms).
99. Eagly, supra note 76, at 202 (observing that institutional investors are often
attentive to board governance).
100. Id. (“The increased monitoring associated with the increase in the presence
of women on boards appeared to have positive effects on firms with weak governance
but negative effects otherwise.”).
101. Id.
102. The Nasdaq Stock Mkt. LLC, supra note 1, at 9–10.
103. See Douglas J. Cumming, T.Y. Leung & Oliver Rui, Gender Diversity and
Securities Fraud, 58 ACAD. MGMT. J. 1572, 1577, 1589 (2015) (analyzing China
Securities Regulatory Commission data from 2001 to 2010, including 742 companies
with enforcement actions for fraud and 742 non-fraudulent companies for a control
group).
104. See Yu Chen, John Daniel Eshleman & Jared S. Soileau, Board Gender
Diversity and Internal Control Weaknesses, 33 ADVANCES ACCT. 11, 12 (2016)
(analyzing a sample of 4,267 firm-year observations during the period from 2004 to
2013, beginning “the first year internal control weaknesses were required to be
disclosed under section 404 of SOX [Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002]”).
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and better reporting results,105 while other studies suggested that
more female board members produced better monitoring even if
women board members did not sit on the audit committees
directly.106 The Nasdaq report also found board gender diversity “to
be positively associated with more transparent public
disclosures.”107 What all of these studies have in common is that
they found that greater diversity is linked with greater
transparency, more accurate reporting, and less fraud. Nasdaq
concluded:
There is substantial evidence that board diversity enhances the
quality of a company’s financial reporting, internal controls,
public disclosures and management oversight. In reaching this
conclusion, Nasdaq evaluated the results of more than a dozen
studies spanning more than two decades that found a positive
association between gender diversity and important investor
protections, and the assertions by some academics that such
findings may extend to other forms of diversity, including racial
and ethnic diversity.108

In short, Nasdaq reported that firms with greater diversity were
less likely to be engaged in the practices most closely associated
with short-termism and competitive pay: earnings management,

105. See María Consuelo Pucheta‐ Martínez, Inmaculada Bel-Oms & Gustau
Olcina-Sempere, Corporate Governance, Female Directors and Quality of Financial
Information, 25 BUS. ETHICS: EUR. REV. 363, 363, 378–79 (2016) (analyzing a sample
of non-financial companies listed on the Madrid Stock Exchange during 2004 to 2011
and finding that “the percentage of females on [audit committees] reduces the
likelihood of receiving error, non-compliance or omission of information
qualifications”).
106. The Nasdaq Stock Mkt. LLC, supra note 1, at 27 (citing Chen et al., supra
note 104, at 18) (finding that more female members produced better monitoring
broadly, but not directly addressing their committees); see also Aida Sijamic Wahid,
The Effects and the Mechanisms of Board Gender Diversity: Evidence from Financial
Manipulation, 159 J. BUS. ETHICS 705, 706, 710 (2019) (analyzing 6,132 U.S. public
companies during the period from 2000 to 2010, for a total of 38,273 firm-year
observations).
107. The Nasdaq Report notes that:
Gul, Srinidhi & Ng (2011) concluded that “gender diversity improves stock price
informativeness by increasing voluntary public disclosures in large firms and
increasing the incentives for private information collection in small
firms.” Abad et al. (2017) concluded that companies with gender diverse boards
are associated with lower levels of information asymmetry, suggesting
that increasing board gender diversity is associated with “reducing the risk of
informed trading and enhancing stock liquidity.”
The Nasdaq Stock Mkt. LLC, supra note 1, at 27–28.
108. U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, No. 34-90574, SELF-REGULATORY
ORGANIZATIONS; THE NASDAQ STOCK MARKET LLC; NOTICE OF FILING OF PROPOSED
RULE CHANGE TO ADOPT LISTING RULES RELATED TO BOARD DIVERSITY 22 (2020),
https://www.sec.gov/rules/sro/nasdaq/2020/34-90574.pdf [https://perma.cc/9MHQWJ9J].
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accounting manipulation and fraud, and the suborning of internal
controls.109
An Australian study looked at different factors, finding that
adding women to boards strengthened a company’s willingness to
take prosocial actions, which produced higher levels of corporate
social responsibility (CSR).110 CSR, in turn, was positively linked to
financial performance.111 Once the study controlled for the CSR
effect, the women’s impact on firm performance became statistically
insignificant.112 The study concluded that increasing CSR, not the
presence of women per se, turned out to be the decisive factor on
firm performance.113 Nonetheless, although it is difficult to
establish the causal mechanism,114 it appears that “female directors
tend to be less conformist and are more likely to exhibit activism
and express their independent views than male directors because
they do not belong to ‘old-boy’ networks.”115 The relationship
between gender diversity and CSR is stronger than that “between
board gender diversity and company performance . . . .”116 This
effect, as the author of the Australian study suggests, may depend
less on the presence of women than on which women are selected.117
Nonetheless, the study finds that greater diversity, whatever the
cause, tends to counter an exclusive focus on shareholders to the
exclusion of other stakeholders who might affect the company’s
long-term prospects.118

109. See supra discussion in text at notes 26–28, 30–35, 62–64, 67–68.
110. Jeremy Galbreath, Is Board Gender Diversity Linked to Financial
Performance? The Mediating Mechanism of CSR, 57 BUS. & SOC’Y 863, 863 (2018).
111. Id. at 881 (finding that CSR activities appear to be positively linked to
financial performance).
112. Id. at 876.
113. Id. at 863 (noting that CSR appears to fully account for the connection
between the presence of women on boards and increased financial performance).
114. “It’s worth noting that even if the meta-analyses revealed a stronger
relationship between board gender diversity and firm performance, we couldn’t
conclude that board gender diversity causes firm performance. To establish causal
effects, you need to conduct a randomized control trial. But, that’s impossible here;
we can’t randomly assign board members to companies.” Klein, supra note 88.
Indeed, “[t]he women named to corporate boards may not in fact differ very much in
their values, experiences, and knowledge from the men who already serve on these
boards.” Id.
115. Jie Chen, Woon Sau Leung, Wei Song & Marc Goergen, Why Female Board
Representation Matters: The Role of Female Directors in Reducing Male CEO
Overconfidence, 53 J. EMPIRICAL FIN. 70, 72 (2019).
116. Klein, supra note 88.
117. Cf. Galbreath, supra note 110, at 867–70 (describing specific characteristics
of women that, if present, may lead to increased CSR, and thus to increased financial
performance).
118. Id. (describing a stakeholder perspective theory which posits that, as the
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These studies cannot tease out the effect women board
members have on financial reporting with any precision. Instead,
the relevant factors the studies identify are associated with both the
presence of more women and better business performance.119 Any
causal relationships are likely to be multidirectional. Firms that
operate in a more transparent way may be more hospitable to
diverse boards, and firms that diversify by bringing in board
members through less conventional networks—or simply networks
less closely tied to existing management—may find that their new
board members ask different questions and probe in different ways
from board members who rise through more insular networks. The
issue of the relationship between board diversity and performance
may thus be more about openness to outsiders than about the
inclusion of women per se.120
B. The Business Case for Diverse Management
A primary purpose of corporate boards is monitoring, and
abuses such as earnings manipulation and accounting fraud cannot
flourish once boards shine a spotlight on the practices. Once such
practices are illuminated, a series of processes come into play that
are likely to lead to reform of those practices.121 Accordingly, to the
demonstration of CSR is linked to meeting the interests of a broader group of
stakeholders, the presence of women board members who encourage CSR will benefit
non-shareholder stakeholders).
119. See, e.g., Klein, supra note 88; see also Cumming et al., supra note 103, at
1572.
120. See, e.g., Barbara Shecter, Diverse Boards Tied to Fewer Financial
‘Irregularities,’ Canadian Study Finds, FIN. POST (Feb. 5, 2020),
https://financialpost.com/news/fp-street/diverse-boards-tied-to-fewer-financialirregularities-canadian-study-finds [https://perma.cc/LR29-VC7S] (“If you’re going
to introduce perspectives, those perspectives might be coming not just from male
versus female. They could be coming from people of different ages, from different
racial backgrounds . . . [and] [i]f we just focus on one, we could be essentially taking
away from other dimensions of diversity and decreasing perspective.” (internal
quotations omitted)). On avoiding groupthink, see Lynne L. Dallas, The New
Managerialism and Diversity on Corporate Boards of Directors, 76 TUL. L. REV. 1363,
1384–91 (2002). See also AARON A. DHIR, CHALLENGING BOARDROOM HOMOGENEITY:
CORPORATE LAW, GOVERNANCE, AND DIVERSITY 107–08, 121 (2015) (introducing a
study of boardroom homogeneity where sample included 23 directors of Norwegian
corporate boards, representing an aggregate of 95 board appointments at more than
70 corporations); see also Gennaro Bernile, Vineet Bhagwat & Scott Yonker, Board
Diversity, Firm Risk, and Corporate Policies, 127 J. FIN. ECON. 588, 591 (2017)
(analyzing 21,572 firm-year observations across non-financial, non-utility firms for
the years 1996 to 2014, based on the ExecuComp, RiskMetrics, Compustat, and
CRSP databases).
121. While the risk of liability for corporate board members is typically low,
participation in or countenance of fraud can expose directors to liability. Urska
Velikonja, Leverage, Sanctions, and Deterrence of Accounting Fraud, 44 U.C. DAVIS
L. REV. 1281, 1328 (2011).
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extent more diverse boards are more inclined to look into the
shadows of corporate operations, the more likely they are to discover
abuses, which benefits the long-term health of companies.122
The case for diverse management is more complex.
Management sets the tone for the entire company. As we indicated
in Section I, corporate reformers have focused on high stakes
bonuses systems as a source of both ineffective management and
workplaces hostile to diversity. These systems, whether at corrupt
companies like Enron123 or more conventional companies like
Microsoft,124 have been identified with greater distrust, higher
turnover, lower productivity, lesser diversity, and greater gender
disparities in compensation.125 Such systems tend to emphasize
reductionist, short-term, transactional metrics:126 Jack Welch, for
example, at the height of GE’s earnings management era,
emphasized how important it was that his managers were “hitting
the numbers.”127 At their worst, these systems encourage
“masculinity contest cultures” that produce higher turnover, sexual
harassment, bullying, and lower morale.128 The literature on
diversity and upper management should accordingly be interpreted
through this lens.
The studies show that diverse management, just like diverse
boards, creates value in multiple ways: it leads to greater
profitability, market share growth, and more inclusive
organizational cultures.129 These analyses, however, suffer from the
same issues that affect studies of corporate boards: the correlations
have been repeatedly documented while causation is difficult to
establish. Like the board literature, they also point to certain
management factors as potential causal factors associated with
both greater diversity and better firm performance.
122. Cf. Michael C. Jensen, Paying People to Lie: The Truth About the Budgeting
Process, 9 EUR. FIN. MGMT. 379, 379 (2003) (claiming that uncovering and stopping
the cycle of budget gaming can increase productivity and value in firms).
123. Dallas, Enron, supra note 27, at 37; see also supra discussion in Section I
(regarding Enron’s business practices).
124. Carbone, Cahn & Levit, The Triple Bind, supra note 11, at 1119–20.
125. See supra text accompanying notes 5–7, 51–57.
126. Carbone, Cahn & Levit, Gender and the Tournament, supra note 13, at 427.
127. Carbone & Black, The Problem with Predators, supra note 7, at 465 (“In
Welch’s case, hitting the numbers ordinarily meant beating earnings estimates. . . .
Welch beat the estimates almost every quarter for two decades, and GE faced a major
securities fraud investigation once he left.”).
128. See supra discussion in Section I, text accompanying notes 54–58; see also
Berdahl et al., supra note 6.
129. Indeed, many companies achieve a significant degree of diversity in their
entry level ranks without much diversity in their more significant decision-making
levels. HUNT ET AL., supra note 79.
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Some of the most influential studies look at the relationship
between diversity and performance without controls that attempt
to establish causation. The Wall Street Journal, for example, in a
2019 study, ranked the diversity of S&P 500 companies and then
compared the most- and least-diverse companies along various
performance metrics.130 The top twenty companies, with the
greatest amount of diversity, had an annual return in share
performance of 10% over a five-period and 14% over a ten-year
period, compared to the twenty least-diverse firms’ returns of 4.2%
and 12%.131
Three studies by McKinsey (published in 2015, 2018, 2020)
show a strong association between diversity and financial
performance.132 The most recent such study focused on the
companies in the top quartile for gender diversity on management
teams and found that these companies “were 25[%] more likely to
experience above-average profitability than peer companies in the
fourth quartile . . . up from 21[%] in 2017 and 15[%] in 2014.”133 A
2009 study found that racial workforce diversity is correlated
positively with a range of economic indicators, including larger
market share and greater sales revenues, while gender diversity
also correlates with greater sales revenue and increased profits.134
A Credit Suisse study similarly “demonstrated that investment
returns are 10[%] higher at companies with policies inclusive of
LGBT+ people.”135
A meta-analysis of studies, however, by Jeong and Harrison,
looked at 146 primary studies conducted in 33 different countries
and found that “[f]emale representation in the upper echelons in
general is positively and weakly related to forms of long-term
financial performance, but negatively and weakly related to short-

130. Dieter Holger, The Business Case for More Diversity, WALL ST. J. (Oct. 26,
2019),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/the-business-case-for-more-diversity11572091200 [https://perma.cc/T4X7-E3LC].
131. Id.
132. SUNDIATU DIXON-FYLE, KEVIN DOLAN, VIVIAN HUNT & SARA PRINCE,
MCKINSEY & CO., DIVERSITY WINS: HOW INCLUSION MATTERS 3 (2020),
https://www.mckinsey.com/featured-insights/diversity-and-inclusion/diversity-winshow-inclusion-matters [https://perma.cc/UD9X-V8E7].
133. Id.
134. Cedric Herring, Does Diversity Pay?: Race, Gender, and the Business Case for
Diversity, 74 AM. SOCIO. REV. 208, 219–20 (2009).
135. Stephanie Sandberg, It’s 2017: Do You Know Where Your LGBT+ Board
Candidates Are?, HUFFINGTON POST (Apr. 4, 2017), https://www.huffingtonpost.com/
entry/its-2017-do-you-know-where-your-lgbt-boardcandidates_us_58e3c8cbe4b09deecf0e1a91 [https://perma.cc/GGZ5-89GY].
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term stock market returns.”136 The meta-analysis found that there
is a “short-term drop in stock market returns following the
announcement of female CEO appointments,” rather than a
response to firm performance.137 Overall, the meta-analysis found
that studies of upper management, much like board studies,
produced mixed results; that is, once appropriate controls were
added, much of the increased performance from greater diversity
disappeared.138 There are, nonetheless, also intriguing indications
of what some of the causal relationships might involve.
The meta-analysis’s most important finding involved the
comparison between short-term and long-term performance.139
Short-term performance appeared to reflect investor bias.140 The
authors asserted that long-term performance, on the other hand,
involved firm decision-making that reduced strategic risk-taking
and “explains why financial performance is improved.”141 They
found correlations between greater inclusion of women in upper
management and better decision-making, postulating that the
inclusion of women moderated the tendency of all-male decisionmaking groups to take more risks, in part because of the tendency
of homogeneous groups to reach more extreme conclusions.142
In explaining their conclusions, Jeong and Harrison
hypothesized that it may not be women, per se, but the impact of
greater diversity on deliberations that creates the causal effect.143
Other studies suggest that these results may be context
136. Seung-Hwan Jeong & David A. Harrison, Glass Breaking, Strategy Making,
and Value Creating: Meta-Analytic Outcomes of Women as CEOs and TMT Members,
60 ACAD. MGMT. J. 1219, 1219 (2016) (analyzing studies, with the largest group of
studies coming from the United States).
137. Id. at 1234.
138. Id. at 1233.
139. Id. at 1234.
140. Id. at 1226, 1233–34 (noting an expected short-term backlash by the financial
market due to anti-female CEO bias among investors).
141. Id. at 1219.
142. Id. at 1235 (“Our meta-analytic path analysis shows this reduction in
strategic risk-taking—empirically captured through financial leverage, capital
expenditures, and stock volatility—is one reason why female representation is linked
to improved financial performance in the long run.”). An underlying premise of the
focus on risk-taking in the meta-analysis assumed that women are more risk averse.
Id. at 1223 (“While several studies report evidence that existing patterns of gender
differences in risk-taking might not apply to some managerial contexts, such
evidence is outweighed by the larger and broader body of robust evidence which has
established that females in general, and in their roles as CEOs, are risk-averse
compared to males.”) (citations omitted). That assumption may not be accurate. See
Lara et al., supra note 78, at 3.
143. Jeong & Harrison, supra note 136, at 1223–24 (noting theories of group
polarization which offer explanations for extreme or risky behavior).
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dependent.144 In finance, for example, a major purpose of hedge
funds and other investment firms is to manage risk, and there is no
suggestion that women fund managers are more risk averse than
the men in finance.145 Indeed, women-run funds routinely
outperform those run by men, with some observers attributing the
differences to better decision-making practices.146 Economist
Cristian Dezsö, one of those who finds that funds run by women
outperform those run by men, adds a different wrinkle to the
analysis.147 His data show that women in women-dominant groups
take more risks than women in male-dominant environments,
suggesting that, freed from gender stereotypes, the women feel freer
to do so.148 In contrast with the Jeong and Harrison meta-analysis,
though, he discovered that men also took greater risks when more
women were present.149 “Borrowing a conclusion from psychology
research,” he speculated that men in finance “feel threatened when
they see females taking on more risk. So, they respond by taking
more risk, too.”150 Either way, these findings suggest it is the
dynamic of the group rather than the sex of the decision-maker that
determines outcome quality.151
Other studies of diversity find that these effects may vary by
industry. In considering innovation, for example, the findings may
be particularly robust. One study found “a strong and statistically
significant correlation between the diversity of management teams
144. Michael Brush, Here’s Why Women Fund Managers Regularly Outperform
Men, Based on Newer Research, MARKETWATCH (Oct. 23, 2020),
https://www.marketwatch.com/story/heres-why-women-fund-managers-regularlyoutperform-men-and-seven-stocks-thatll-help-you-do-the-same-11603382699
[https://perma.cc/XEK6-MKAU].
145. Id.
146. Steve Garmhausen, Women: Better Advisors?, BARRON’S (June 2, 2012),
https://www.barrons.com/articles/SB500014240531119040810045774383011406354
94 [https://perma.cc/WAC7-G8Y7]; see also Eric McWhinnie, Women Are Mostly
Better Investors than Men, USA TODAY (Mar. 9, 2014), https://www.usatoday.com/
story/money/personalfinance/2014/03/09/women-better-investors-thanmen/6176601/ [https://perma.cc/KQZ5-QGC5].
147. SMITH BRAIN TR., How Risk and Gender Affect Fund Manager Performance
(Oct. 28, 2020), https://www.rhsmith.umd.edu/faculty-research/smithbraintrust/
insights/how-risk-and-gender-affect-fund-manager-performance [https://perma.cc/
LDD7-KUSG].
148. Id.
149. Id.
150. Id.
151. Indeed, a different study attempting to tease out the relationship between
women board members and risk in non-financial firms found no relationship once
appropriate controls were introduced. See Vathunyoo Sila, Angelica Gonzalez & Jens
Hagendorff, Women on Board: Does Boardroom Gender Diversity Affect Firm Risk?,
36 J. CORP. FIN. 26, 45–46 (2016).
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and overall innovation.”152 The firms with greater than average
diversity on their management teams “reported innovation revenue
that was nineteen percentage points higher than that of companies
with below-average leadership diversity.”153 The study did not just
consider gender diversity, however. It examined diversity across a
number of different dimensions and found “the most significant
gains came from changing the makeup of the leadership team in
terms of the national origin of executives, range of industry
backgrounds, gender balance, and career paths.”154 Hiring
managers from a different industry and hiring more women had
similarly positive effects on firm innovation.155 Other studies,
looking specifically at new ventures, have also found a relationship
between a management team’s gender diversity and the innovation
performance of the firm.156
Like the studies of board diversity, the studies focused on
management find that openness to different views matters.157 They
also found that “participative” leadership that encourages frequent
and open communication and fair employment practices contributes
to effective workplace innovation.158
What these studies generally suggest is a contrast between the
intense, competitive, negative sum workplaces that characterize
masculinity contest cultures159 and the more productive, innovative
workplaces that pay greater attention to employee morale.160

152. Rocio Lorenzo, Nicole Voigt, Miki Tsusaka, Matt Krentz & Katie Abouzahr,
How Diverse Leadership Teams Boost Innovation, BCG HENDERSON INST. (Jan. 23,
2018), https://www.bcg.com/publications/2018/how-diverse-leadership-teams-boostinnovation [https://perma.cc/7GX6-2DKE].
153. Id.
154. Id.
155. Id.
156. See Ye Dai, Gukdo Byun & Fangsheng Ding, The Direct and Indirect Impact
of Gender Diversity in New Venture Teams on Innovation Performance, 43
ENTREPRENEURSHIP THEORY & PRAC. 505 (2019).
157. Id.
158. Id. at 511. Other studies of gender based differences in leadership styles
suggest that gender diverse leadership styles tend to be “more participative,
democratic, and communal” and to encourage “more productive discourse and the
airing of different points of view” than exclusively male leadership styles. Galbreath,
supra note 110, at 868.
159. Carbone & Black, The Problem with Predators, supra note 7, at 478 (“These
cultures make winning at all cost the test of success, and tolerate self interested, unethical, and counterproductive behavior. ”).
160. See, e.g., DONALD HISLOP, KNOWLEDGE MANAGEMENT IN ORGANIZATIONS 230
(3rd ed. 2013) (describing how the most effective way to deal with problems such as
employee turnover is to develop institutional identity and employee loyalty, and
observing that institutional identity that encourages employees to identify with firm
objectives creates stronger loyalty than instrumental measures such as merit pay or
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Economists George Akerlof and Rachel Kranton, for example, have
argued that workers who think of themselves as insiders rather
than outsiders require less in the way of extra compensation to
produce desired results and become less likely to game the
compensation systems that do exist.161 They conclude that “[w]orker
identification may therefore be a major factor, perhaps even the
dominant factor, in the success or failure of organizations” and
suggest that high stakes bonus systems are often
counterproductive.162 More conventional management theorists
similarly emphasize factors such as engaging workers, staying
committed, creating trust, and keeping open lines of
communication.163
A meta-analysis of management styles, for example, found
that for both men and women, “transformational” practices that
communicate a compelling vision and pay attention to subordinates’
individual needs produce the strongest positive results.164 In
contrast, managers who rely on a “transactional” approach based on
incentive systems, bottom line metrics defining organizational
objectives, and attention to problems rather than successes do not
do as well.165 Women leaders were more likely than the men to
adopt transformational leadership styles.166 The study authors
speculate that this may be true, in part, because transformational
styles conformed more closely to female gender stereotypes.167 Thus,
women who adopted other styles faced greater challenges from role
incongruity.168 The authors conclude that the differences in
leadership styles may explain why some studies find women to be
more effective leaders—the women who rise through the leadership
ranks tend to use (and may be selected because they use) more
bonuses).
161. GEORGE AKERLOF & RACHEL KRANTON, IDENTITY ECONOMICS: HOW OUR
IDENTITIES SHAPE OUR WORK, WAGES, AND WELL-BEING 59 (2010).
162. Id.
163. See, e.g., 8 Best Practices in Business Management, UNIV. OF ST. MARY,
https://online.stmary.edu/mba/resources/8-best-practices-in-business-management
[https://perma.cc/N28H-JVMW]; see also Alice H. Eagly, Mary C. Johannesen-Schidt
& Marloes L. van Engen, Transformational, Transactional, and LaissezFaire Leadership Styles: A Meta-Analysis Comparing Women and Men, 129
PSYCHOL. BULL. 569, 586 (2003) (summarizing the theory of leadership advice and
observing that “as . . . textual analysis of mass-market books on management shows,
managers are exhorted to ‘reorient themselves toward a new role of coordinating,
facilitating, coaching, supporting, and nurturing their employees’”).
164. Eagly et al., supra note 163, at 570–72.
165. Id.
166. Id. at 578–79.
167. Id. at 572–73.
168. Id.
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effective techniques than the men.169 These techniques, however,
work for men just as well as women.170
These studies suggest that adding women—and, indeed,
increasing diversity generally—can have a positive impact on
corporate performance, but that it may not simply be the presence
of women per se that has the effect. Instead, it is the interaction of
diversity with the broader corporate context that produces the
result.171 Indeed, recruiting, retaining, and promoting women
executives may require reforming the most destructive aspects of
competitive business cultures, and that may account for a
significant part of the reason for the improved performance
associated with greater diversity.172
III. Diversity as a Tool of Management Reform
The current generation of corporate reformers advocates not
only for greater diversity as an end in itself but also for reforms that
challenge shareholder primacy and its related emphasis on shorttermism and bonus-based competitive pay.173 Given the lack of
conclusive findings on the impact of diversity in isolation, the classic
justifications for greater diversity combine a moral case for
diversity (including those who have been systematically excluded in
the past is the right thing to do) and a business case for diversity
(more diverse firms, at worst, do as well as other companies and at
best do better, so there is no reason not to pursue diversity). This
Article, however, suggests that while social science research cannot
isolate causal links in a statistically rigorous way, it can identify
the circumstances in which management reform and diversity
efforts are most likely to reinforce each other.
A. Finding the Buried Bodies
The literature on corporate boards suggests that the
correlations between greater diversity and improved medium- to
long-term firm performance may involve greater monitoring and a
169. Id. at 586–87.
170. Id.
171. See, e.g., Galbreath, supra note 110 (suggesting that increasing the
representation of women on boards increases the corporate focus on community
social responsibility and that doing so increases performance over time).
172. For an example of a destructive workplace culture that combines seven figure
bonuses, unethical conduct, and gender disparities, see Complaint, Messina v. Bank
of Am. Corp., No. 1:16-cv-03653 (S.D.N.Y. 2016).
173. See, e.g., Barzuza et al., supra note 32, at 1279 (describing generational
differences in ESG investing and describing how ESG investing differs from hedge
funds focused on short-term results).
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lesser incidence of accounting irregularities, earnings management,
and fraud.174 Companies that expand the number of diverse board
members, particularly within a short period, may have to expand
their search efforts to find board members, breaking the insularity
of some existing boards. And, indeed, as we pointed out above,
women are more likely to be appointed to independent board
positions than to be appointed either from the hedge funds engaged
in activist investing or the management board positions more
directly under the control of the CEO.175
The impact of bringing in newcomers may be particularly
great in companies that “manage” earnings, cover up unfavorable
developments, disguise unethical conduct, or engage in legally
dubious activities that create potential exposure to negative
publicity, enforcement actions, or other risks.176 Effective board
monitoring is expected to police such activities; the creation of more
diverse boards may well have maximum impact in circumstances
where diversity recruiting increases the likelihood of effective
monitoring or greater firm transparency. As we demonstrated in
Sections I.B and II.B above, women who make it to upper
management often demonstrate different qualities from the men
who thrive in corporate tournaments.177 In addition, given the
paucity of women in upper management, CEOs may be less able to
handpick women they know well.178 So long as upper management
is a boys’ club, women board members are less likely to reflect the
amoral, misogynist, narcissistic mindset that characterizes the
corporate environments ripe for reform. Over time, of course,
women on corporate boards may come to reflect the same
perspectives as the men. Indeed, corporate board members, male or
female, have innumerable incentives to look the other way with
respect to management irregularities. The push for women on
corporate boards may well come from the fact that it is relatively
easy: firms can simply expand the size of the boards and add more
women without significantly changing firm dynamics.179 Sam
174. See The Nasdaq Stock Mkt. LLC, supra note 1.
175. See Shepherd & Teare, supra note 92.
176. The Nasdaq Stock Mkt. LLC, supra note 1, at 15 (“[C]ertain groups may be
underrepresented on boards because the traditional director nomination process is
limited by directors looking within their own social networks for candidates with
previous C-suite experience.”).
177. See discussion supra Sections I.B, II.B.
178. See Shepherd & Teare, supra note 92.
179. See, e.g., Alexander Osipovich & Akane Otani, Nasdaq Seeks Board-Diversity
Rule That Most Listed Firms Don’t Meet, WALL ST. J. (Dec. 1, 2020),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/nasdaq-proposes-board-diversity-rule-for-listedcompanies-11606829244?mod=article_inline
[https://perma.cc/3M4W-H9C7]
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Walton, after all, dealt with pressure to increase diversity in the
eighties by adding Hillary Clinton to the Walmart board.180 As the
board’s first woman, youngest member, and one of the few board
members lacking business experience, she had little impact.181 The
much more important changes in corporate cultures would come
from greater diversity not just on boards but in upper management.
B. Eliminating the Incompetent Bullies
While the stock market (and CEO salaries) have soared,
conventional measures of firm performance, such as increases in
productivity, show that companies have performed less well over
the last forty years than they did during the supposedly complacent
managerial era.182 A global study of CEO efficacy indicates that
CEOs of the shareholder primacy era contribute little to improved
firm function, with CEOs who are paid more not performing any
better. The study concludes that the results suggest that the
performance of CEOs “tend[s] to follow the performance of their
firms.”183 Although women constituted less than 10% of the sample,
the authors found that “the overperformance of CEOs in top
companies
is
driven
by
female
CEOs . . . [and]
the
underperformance of CEOs in the worst-performing companies is
mostly due to male CEOs.”184
At the same time, the literature identifying the factors that
drive women out emphasizes the same factors that depress
teamwork and innovation: negative sum internal competition, lack
of trust, emotionally distant—or abusive—managers, and the lack
of loyalty and commitment between employers and employers.185
(commenting that increasing board diversity should not cost much).
180. See Michael Barbaro, As a Director, Clinton Moved Wal-Mart Board, but Only
So Far, N.Y. TIMES (May 20, 2007), https://www.nytimes.com/2007/05/20/us/politics/
20walmart.html [https://perma.cc/BU98-P5VD].
181. Id.
182. See Brett Arends, CEO Pay Has Gone Up 10-fold in the Past 40 Years—Do
They Deserve It?, MARKETWATCH (Apr. 16, 2021), https://www.marketwatch.com/
story/hey-honchos-give-us-back-our-money-11618519002?mod=hp_minor_pos19&
adobe_mc=MCMID%3D05280436024580085122294529340144801967%7CMCORGI
D%3DCB68E4BA55144CAA0A4C98A5%2540AdobeOrg%7CTS%3D1618590882
[https://perma.cc/8N7Y-VBJZ].
183. Arturo Bris & Maryam Zargari, A Bullshit Job? A Global Study on the Value
of CEOs, SSRN, Mar. 16, 2021, at 31, https://ssrn.com/abstract=3805610
[https://perma.cc/C7TZ-3DUM].
184. Id. at 30.
185. Compare PATRICK LENCIONI, THE FIVE DYSFUNCTIONS OF A TEAM 188–89
(2002), with Kim Williams, Women in Tech: How to Attract and Retain Top Talent,
INDEED (Nov. 6, 2018), http://blog.indeed.com/2018/11/06/women-in-tech-report/
[https://perma.cc/87PW-YSMV] (describing poor managers and harassment as major
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Business psychology professor Tomas Chamorro-Premuzic
argues that, instead of establishing gender quotas,
a more reasonable goal would be to focus instead on selecting
better leaders, as this step would also take care of the gender
imbalance. Putting more women in leadership roles does not
necessarily improve the quality of leadership, whereas putting
more talented leaders into leadership roles will increase the
representation of women.186

That is, while firms seem quite willing to promote “incompetent” or
bullying, amoral, and narcissistic men, they are less willing to
promote such women.187 Simply selecting more competent
managers would thus increase the percentage of women.
Focusing on a company’s ability to retain a more diverse
workforce may help to identify and reform toxic workplaces. A
telling factor at Uber was the fact that while the company initially
hired women as 20% of its workforce, that number fell to 7% due to
the company’s dysfunctional management practices.188 Similarly, a
sex discrimination class action brought against Microsoft persuaded
the company to eliminate its stack ranking evaluation system, a
system that many observers believe contributed not just to gender
disparities but to Microsoft’s loss of its competitive edge in
designing new technology.189 The problems at these companies
came to light only when they became the subject of high profile sex

reasons for women leaving tech).
186. Chamorro-Premuzic, supra note 59, at 172–73.
187. For discussions of the classic double bind in which women are treated more
harshly for engaging in the same conduct as men, see Mark L. Egan, Gregor Matvos
& Amit Seru, When Harry Fired Sally: The Double Standard in Punishing
Misconduct 3 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Rsch., Working Paper No. 23242, Mar. 2017),
https://www.nber.org/papers/w23242 [https://perma.cc/JSU7-JAAL]; Alicia R.
Ingersoll, Christy Glass, Alison Cook & Karl Joseph Olsen, Power, Status and
Expectations: How Narcissism Manifests Among Women CEOs, 158 J. BUS. ETHICS
893, 894 (2017) (“[W]omen leaders who display narcissistic personalities are
perceived by men subordinates as less effective leaders than equally narcissistic
men leaders . . . which suggests narcissistic women leaders may face biases that
narcissistic men leaders do not.”).
188. See Complaint ¶ 22, Avendano v. Uber Technologies, Inc. (No. CGC-18566677),
https://images.law.com/contrib/content/uploads/documents/403/15670/Complaint1.pdf.
189. See Erika Anderson, The Management Approach Guaranteed to Wreck Your
Best People, FORBES (July 6, 2012), https://www.forbes.com/sites/erikaandersen/
2012/07/06/the-management-approach-guaranteed-to-wreck-your-bestpeople/?sh=264c35205743 [https://perma.cc/6AZD-CHWP]; Kurt Eichenwald,
Microsoft’s Lost Decade, VANITY FAIR (July 24, 2012), http://www.vanityfair.com/
news/business/2012/08/microsoft-lost-mojo-steve-ballmer
[https://perma.cc/7H2SZXSX].
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discrimination complaints.190 Diversity can be an effective
barometer of management effectiveness.
Conclusion
Using diversity as an instrument of corporate reform requires
more than adding a few women and stirring. Corporate leaders,
after all, are adept at window dressing.191 Nor is it simply a matter
of diversity training or increased sensitivity to cultural
differences.192 Instead, it requires taking the idea of teamwork and
trust seriously. The areas in the economy with the greatest gender
disparities, including finance and tech, have high turnover rates for
everyone—and even higher rates for women.193
Conversely, the workplaces that best promote innovation are
also more effective at promoting diversity. The qualities that
promote both diversity and innovation in such environments are
“fair employment practices, such as equal pay; participative
leadership, with different views being heard and valued; a strategic
emphasis on diversity led by the CEO; frequent and open
communication; and a culture of openness to new ideas.”194
Along these lines, diversity should not just be a matter of
adding a few women to corporate boards. Doing so in one sense is
easy; legislatures can require increased board diversity without
significant disruption to the corporate bottom line (or male
careers).195 If diversity is important to business performance,
management policies, or gender justice, however, then the inquiry
should be extended beyond board representation.
Furthermore, sustaining diversity requires a critical mass.
Diversity is an iterative process that spurs more progressive

190. See Susan Fowler, Reflecting on One Very, Very Strange Year at Uber, SUSAN
FOWLER (Feb. 19, 2017), https://www.susanjfowler.com/blog/2017/2/19/reflecting-onone-very-strange-year-at-uber [https://perma.cc/TG84-8XJB].
191. See, e.g., Barbaro, supra note 180 (acknowledging Clinton encouraged
Walmart to hire more women but did not challenge its rampant anti-unionism).
192. See Alexandra Kalev, Erin Kelly & Frank Dobbin, Best Practices or Best
Guesses? Assessing the Efficacy of Corporate Affirmative Action and Diversity
Policies, 71 AM. SOC. REV. 589, 611 (2006).
193. See Trae Vassallo, Ellen Levy, Michele Madansky, Hillary Mickell, Bennett
Porter, Monica Leas & Julie Oberweis, A 2015 Report of: Elephant in the Valley,
https://www.elephantinthevalley.com/ [https://perma.cc/H3GE-XBKA]; Williams,
supra note 185.
194. How
Diverse
Leadership
Teams
Boost
Innovation,
SHINE,
https://www.shine4women.com/diverse-leadership-teams-boost-innovation/
[https://perma.cc/A7BZ-Y3BY].
195. See, e.g., Osipovich & Otani, supra note 179 (commenting that increasing
board diversity should not cost much).
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change.196 Once workplaces become genuinely more diverse from
entry level positions to the corporate boardroom, it spurs other
changes that may have nothing to do with diversity per se. In the
instrumental view, therefore, diversity is both a result and an
architect of change.
The instrumental case for diversity we advocate in this Article
concludes that better diversity is intertwined with better
management. What is critical is “how an organization harnesses
diversity, and whether it’s willing to reshape its power structure.”197
Diversity is an indication, both internally and externally, of a
company’s values. While adding women and stirring has not been
shown to be a causal factor for better business performance, the
failure of a company to be able to maintain a diverse board or
diverse management is a sign that something other than path
dependence or unconscious bias and microaggressions is occurring
at the company. Accordingly, for ESG investors who want to reform
management practices—short termism, accounting fraud, ripping
off customers, and low productivity because of poor management—
diversity is both a metric and a tool, signaling problems or serving
as a marker of change.
Corporate reform per se cannot address structural issues such
as the lack of affordable childcare or deeply entrenched racial
inequality, but it can address the dysfunctional aspects of corporate
governance that have arisen in the shareholder primacy era.

196. On the level of political theory, “[t]he value of diversity is, first, instrumental
because . . . cultural and national diversity reduces the concentration of political
power within a state.” Rainer Bauböck, Cherishing Diversity and Promoting Political
Community, 1 ETHNICITIES 109, 113 (2001). This idea of diversity and power
undoubtedly works on the micro level within companies as well as the macro level in
nation states. Changing management practices to ensure ongoing diversity may also
provide a basis for improved working conditions throughout the company. But
guaranteeing a livable minimum wage and health care and retirement benefits for
all requires the rule of law.
197. Ely & Thomas, supra note 75.

